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Abstract
What are the epistemological and political contours of evidence today? This intro-
duction to the special issue lays out key shifts in the contemporary politics of knowl-
edge and describes the collective contribution of the six papers as an articulation of
what we describe as a ‘new empiricism’, exploring how earlier historical appeals to
evidence to defend political power and decision-making both chime with and differ
from those of the contemporary era. We outline some emerging empirical frontiers
in the study of instruments of calculation, from the evolution of the randomized
controlled trial (RCT) to the growing importance of big data, and explore how
these methodological transformations intersect with the alleged crisis of expertise
in the ‘post-truth’ era. In so doing, we suggest that the ambiguity of evidence can
be a powerful tool in itself, and we relate this ambiguity to the ideological commit-
ment and moral fervour that is elicited through appeals to, and the performance of,
evaluation.
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Introduction
Instead of considering reason as the truth of the subject, we can look to other
foundational categories that are less abstract and more tactile, such as life and
death. (Achille Mbembe, Necropolitics, 2003, p. 14)
Today the authority of facts is both far-reaching and fragile. The growing influ-
ence of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) in economics, political science,
development studies and humanitarian work underscores the dominance of
an ‘evidence-based’ style of decision-making in contemporary governance.
Global health, a field that has quickly consolidated around econometric
models and epidemiological indicators, has effectively transformed health care
into a data management enterprise. Think-tanks and private ‘economic intelli-
gence’ organizations proffering independent research to guide social and econ-
omic policymaking abound. On the cusp of the ‘Big Data Revolution’, large-
scale calculations of population behaviour are seen as an elixir promising to
revive the economy, modernize public service delivery and enhance the
impact of emergency aid. And yet, in the face of this muscular form of fact-
making, faith in the technocrat is flagging.
Those who would believe that we have entered into an age of ‘post-truth’
politics are certainly not short on examples. The erroneous economic calcu-
lations and wild diversity of quantitative guestimates that have dominated the
debate over Brexit in the United Kingdom; the ‘fake news’, ‘alternative facts’
and outright lies that defined the rise to power of the current American presi-
dent: these feel like watershed moments in the abandonment of cherished ideals
about the role of factual evidence in the conduct of political debate. For those
committed to a ‘marketplace of ideas’, the apparent disinterest, on the part of
both political leaders and their publics, in parsing the veracity of political state-
ments is particularly disheartening. Pundits blame economic disenfranchise-
ment, anti-elite sentiment and a desire for change; expert opinions that
support the status quo are commonly rejected, regardless of the accuracy of
their claims. The triumph of Britain’s Leave Campaign and Donald Trump’s
ascendancy lay in grasping the popular zeitgeist and providing it with a plausible
scapegoat, whether in the figure of the illegal immigrant, the climate change
ideologue or the faceless EU bureaucrat. Though roundly discredited by
armies of historians, policy-analysts and fact-checkers, these ‘truths’ drew
their rhetorical power not from their technical accuracy, but rather from their
emotional salience (Povinelli, 2017). Unconstrained by the need to substantiate
arguments with extensive research or reliable figures, political discourse, many
fear, has become a race to the bottom.
What constitutes authoritative evidence in this political climate? To what uses
is evidence put, and what values does it carry? What obligations must be placed
on the companies, such as Google or Facebook, that configure our new public
spheres while profiting from the tracking and steering of online behaviour?
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What counts in the making of facts, and who does the counting? Which empiri-
cal tools and metrics garner sufficient political capital to guide policy during
times of economic uncertainty? And, critically, how do the social sciences
respond to the increasing social and political significance of data while account-
ing for the deepening popular scepticism of the facts that data are used to
support?
These questions demand cross-disciplinary reflection. Recent scholarship
engaged with the social and epistemological implications of new forms of data
collection, including virtual worlds and new valuation metrics, offers a critical
starting point to reconsider the contemporary political contours of empiricism
(Adkins & Lury, 2011; Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Fourcade, 2011). New
digital tools provide a focal point to these discussions, with some commentators
energized by the potential of aggregated data sets to disrupt the distinctions
between qualitative and quantitative approaches, generating richer insight
into political movements, economic transformations and social configurations
(Latour et al., 2012; Marres & Gerlitz, 2016; Savage & Burrow, 2014).
Others are less sanguine, emphasizing the degree of corporate control over
‘big data’, as well as the capacity of technocrats to ‘reduce the noise of
context’, deriving managerialist solutions from aggregations of abstracted infor-
mation (Biehl, 2016, p. 129; see also Adams, 2016; Tufecki, 2014).
The papers in this special issue offer innovative ways to conceptualize what
we will describe as a ‘new empiricism’ using examples from global health, inter-
national development, humanitarian philanthropy and climate change policy –
fields which derive their political support and public salience from appeals to
emergency, social justice and environmental stewardship. Authored by
Donovan, Ehrenstein, Kelly, McGoey, Neyland, Reubi and Thiel, the pieces
draw together different critical traditions, but share an abiding concern with
the scaling, pace and symbolic power of fact-making, and what the temporal
and spatial dimensions of evidence-gathering mean for the shifting relationships
between knowledge, ignorance and power today.
Of particular interest is the conceptual strain that the purported ‘crisis of
expertise’ places on empiricism and, more broadly, on political theory. Below,
we elaborate the histories of several evidence-based discourses, providing new
insights into the distributional logics and welfare claims implicit within the
RCT revolution. Our analysis focuses on the longue durée, rooting the ‘new
empiricism’ in the upheavals that marked the end of the Enlightenment – a
period when a cross-section of political theorists, including Edmund Burke
and, later on, Alexis de Tocqueville, insisted upon the need to base governmen-
tal decisions on a firm command of available evidence, to develop a ‘science of
government’, in Burke’s words (1968 [1790], p. 152).
Notably, the faith in evidence expressed at the end of the eighteenth century
was punctuated with theological claims – to defend royal prerogative or the right
of financial inheritance, in Burke’s case, or to justify imperial conquest, in Toc-
queville’s. In Burke’s case, he drew on God to defend property rights as he
denounces the French revolutionaries’ claim to a ‘right to food’ (Burke, 1790,
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p. 52). Tocqueville appealed to God’s authority to explain how, against all odds,
the world’s weakest and most impoverished peoples had unshackled themselves
from feudal rule. In Democracy in America, he writes that the ‘magnitude of
present achievement’ in achieving more equality suggests that the ‘gradual pro-
gress of equality is something fated’ by divine will (Tocqueville, 1966 [1835],
p. 12). Later on, he also references God’s authority when defending his
staunch support for France’s colonial conquest of Algeria. Tocqueville’s and
Burke’s range of rhetorical registers illustrates the ease with which leading
Enlightenment thinkers were able to draw on competing and often contradic-
tory logics to legitimize established forms of aristocratic privilege, colonial
wealth extraction and white entitlement.
The ability to switch between ‘theological’ and ‘empirical’ justifications for
democratic governance, on the one hand, and imperial conquest, racial subjuga-
tion and class domination, on the other hand, has not abated among elite figures
today, even if social scientists have yet to fully explore the enduring pertinence
and centrality of theology to twenty-first century capitalist expansion and social
stratification (Blencowe, 2016; Comaroff, 2009; Cooper, 2011; Cooper &
Graham, 2015; James, 2015; Konings, 2015; McGoey & Thiel, 2018). Con-
cerned with the ways that evidence can act as both a form of ‘ecstatic knowl-
edge’, in Kelly’s phrasing, and a form of ‘charismatic violence’, as McGoey
and Thiel suggest, our contributions call for a sociology of the ‘new theology’
to complement explorations of the ‘new empiricism’.
Empires of post-truth
Are we living in a post-truth era? Negotiating the cleavages between truth and
political opinion was, according to Hannah Arendt, both the cost and the duty of
a pluralistic society. If, in accordance with democratic principles, we value the
free expression of a diversity of views, then we must be willing to accommodate
disagreement on the nature of human affairs and how best to organize them.
Levied for political purposes, facts convey a sense of self-evidence that preclude
debate and pre-empt civic consensus. ‘Truth’, Arendt writes, ‘has a despotic
character’ (1967, p. 54). Yet, at the same time, it is factual truth – or rather
the notion that facts exist independent of our beliefs – that gives democracy
its purpose and orientation. Respect for ‘the indestructibility… of brutally
elementary data’ is what differentiates the demagogue from the spin-doctor
and democratic states from totalitarian ones (Arendt, 1967, p. 53).
Today the sources of data have multiplied and fragmented, reviving old ques-
tions and raising new ones about the trustworthiness of empirical facts, their
provenance, their claim to objectivity and their ability to reveal underlying pat-
terns of causation (Levin & Leonelli, 2017; Parry & Greenhough, 2017; Prain-
sack & Buyx, 2017). The explosion of digital media and smart technologies have
radically transformed the ease, scale and speed with which data are generated
and circulated – a quantitative deluge often unbound by expert judgement or
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experimental design. The ever-widening gap between numerical data and a
meaningful fact is something that critical theorists see as the hallmark of our
contemporary ‘data society’ – a world in which adjudicating the legitimacy of
political opinion is secondary to gauging and shaping public sentiment for com-
mercial gain (Davies, 2016a; Ehrenstein, 2018; Leonelli, 2015; Lezaun, 2013).
When the algorithms and analytical instruments that inform major news
outlets, political pollsters and multinational companies are those trafficked by
‘computational propagandists’, it hardly seems surprising that scepticism
about the authority of experts is on the rise (see Woolley & Howard, 2017).
The roots of post-truth, however, pre-date the digital revolution. Since at
least the late Enlightenment period, the inherent contradictions between a
valorization of self-interest and private property, on the one hand, and a com-
mitment to equality and public good, on the other, constitute the fault-lines
around which democratic politics are organized. At the end of the eighteenth
century, Burke appealed to the righteousness of empirical evidence and the
superiority of rule by experts to contest the notion of a democratic right to
food, liberty or human equality. ‘What is the use of discussing a man’s abstract
right to food or medicine?’ Burke remarks in his 1790 essay Reflections on the
revolution in France, ‘The question concerns how to procure and administer
them. In that deliberation I shall always advise calling in the aid of the farmer
and the physician rather than the professor of metaphysics’ (Burke, 1968
[1790], p. 151).
Burke’s defence of aristocratic privilege and rule by experts was contested by
pro-democracy adherents such as Mary Wollstonecraft and Thomas Paine, who
each issued manifestos in defence of the ‘rights of man’ within months of the
publication of Burke’s pamphlet. They refuted Burke’s insistence that aristo-
cratic rulers could judiciously allocate resources when the recipients were
deemed to be of subhuman worth and value in comparison to the rulers. Com-
peting presumptions of natural equality, in Wollstonecraft’s and Paine’ views,
and the natural inequality of men, in Burke’s view, underpinned conflicting
views on the legitimacy of French revolutionaries’ right to receive a fair share
of their nation’s wealth. A little over two centuries later, similar debates over
the right to economic and social security underpins populist frustration over
growing wealth inequality, leading to competing truths over the propriety
and defensibility of current global wealth disparities.
Today, the paradoxes of aligning private commercial interests with public
welfare notwithstanding, the notion that maximizing private profits is
somehow fundamental to human nature is precisely the kind of despotic truth
that Arendt warns against. Neoliberalism, a radical extension of the liberal tra-
dition associated with scholars such as Tocqueville, operates through a sort of
Arendtian ‘brutally elementary fact’: the assumption that competition is the
most efficient and thus incontestably advantageous way to allocate public
goods (e.g. Crouch, 2011; Davies, 2016b; Harcourt, 2011; Ong, 2006; Read,
2009).
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Under neoliberalism, therefore, rational policy does not arise from a delibera-
tive consensus over how best to serve public interest, but rather from the see-
mingly objective need to enhance market efficiency to promote economic
development (e.g. Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005; Cooper, 2011; Lazzarato,
2009). The cascade of policies undertaken in the name of value for money –
from deregulation and tariff elimination to the privatization of public domains
previously considered exempt from market relations – have dismantled social
safety nets intended to protect the most vulnerable in society and radically
exacerbating social stratification and inequalities (Mirowski, 2013; Peck,
2008). The universalizing logic of cost calculation evacuates the politics from
these policies and discredits alternatives as failing to meet the principles of
good management (Clarke, 2004; Power, 1997).
Thus another take on the rise of populism – one considerably more compel-
ling than the expression of mass confusion perpetuated by internet bots and blo-
whards – is that it represents a rejection of the neoliberal thesis, and with it all
expressions of its ‘rational’ logic. The spectre of corporate capture haunts pur-
veyors of evidence-based policies and good governance on either side of the
left–right divide. Indeed, if anything is to be learned from the 2007–8 financial
crisis, it was that economists, their complex mathematic models and speculative
projections misrepresent and ultimately fail to understand the realities of the
economy (MacKenzie, 2009; Muniesa, 2014). The social and political failures
of neoliberalism, in short, have profound epistemic reverberations: post-truth
is managerialism come home to roost (Clarke & Newman, 1997; King, 1999).
The question then is: where does a sociological examination of the authority
of evidence go from here? Materialist critiques of neoliberal ideology have been
productive in illuminating the forms of domination and oppression obscured by
economic discourse (Harvey, 2007; Sunder Rajan, 2006). Foucauldian analyses
have served to further particularize and historically situate those dynamics of
power and knowledge and to provide insight into the aesthetics of neoliberal
governance and the varied subjectivities to which contemporary ‘regimes of
truth’ give rise (Barry et al., 1996; Collier, 2012; Miller & Rose, 2008; Rose,
1999).
But there is a palpable sense too of academic frustration with the limits of cri-
tique, perhaps illustrating a growing adoption of what Hirschman (1991) called
the ‘perversity’ thesis: in this case, the idea that progressive critiques of the
status quo unwittingly reinforce the power of conservative forces by calling
into question the epistemic foundations that have generally supported policies
for positive social change. Living in the era of ‘post-truth politics’, critical scru-
tiny of the politics of truth can thus feel at once overdetermined and theoreti-
cally underpowered. The role of post-structuralist theory in ‘the dissolution of
the modern fact’ has prompted much self-reflection from scholars of science and
technology (Collins et al., 2017; Lynch, 2017; Sismondo, 2017, p. 4). While
some read the popular rejection of expertise as evidence of a much-needed epis-
temic democratization (Fuller, 2017), others caution against the authoritarian
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implications of a wholesale destruction of scientific norms and institutions
(Baker & Oreskes, 2017; Phillips, 2017).
Anxieties of responsibility and fears of conceptual capture pervade these dis-
cussions – a shadow cast more clearly over the climate change debate, where
description of the contingency, work and, critically, politics involved in the
making of evidentiary claims can be easily used to bolster scientific denialism
(Demeritt, 2006; Edwards, 2010; see also Fitzgerald, 2017). But beyond
taking sides in a burgeoning ‘war’ between scientific integrity (Latour, 2017)
and the abandonment of truth to expediency, might there be other critical
avenues to follow?
From post-truth to more truth
One way forward may be to recognize the fact that growing political challenges
to the status quo do not necessarily herald a reactionary, anti-enlightened flight
from truth, but rather a demand for more truth. The deeper truths that surface
at the fraying of science and authority occasion a radical form of critique (see
Caduff, 2014) – an unblinking assessment of the racial politics, colonial and neo-
colonial violence that provide the warp and weave of liberal democracy. We have
entered into a ‘negative moment’, as Cameroonian historian and philosopher
Achille Mbembe puts it, a period ‘when contradictory forces – inchoate, frac-
tured, fragmented – are at work but what might come of their interaction is any-
thing but certain’ (Mbembe, 2015).
The forces Mbembe charts emerge from the field of modern state interven-
tion conceptualized by Foucault as biopower. However, rather than elaborate
the rationalities, techniques and practices intended to maximize the life of the
population, Mbembe’s analysis begins from the extension of governmental
control over death. Politics, he argues, is an art of differentiation: dictating
who may live and who may die, which bodies have value and which are expend-
able. The ‘romance’ of personal autonomy that is the mainstay of liberal politics
obscures the ‘instrumentalisation of human existence and the material destruc-
tion of human bodies and populations’ that grounds the sovereign project
(Mbembe, 2003, p. 14). Reading back into Homo economicus the logics of the
slave plantation, Mbembe illuminates ‘the relations of enmity’ – the hostilities,
immiseration, expressions of hate and organized killing necessary for the demo-
cratic project to be realized (Mbembe, 2016).
One of the heuristic advantages of a ‘negative’ reading of liberal democracy is
that it allows us to better parse the analytical importance and, critically, the ‘pro-
miscuous pervasiveness’ of the rise of so-called populism in political practice
and discourse.1 As Molyneux and Osborne (2017) suggest, the term populism
has become a convenient placeholder for the varied and competing demands
of groups with discordant grievances, some of whose complaints are more legit-
imate than others. ‘More often than not when the concept of populism is
invoked’, they suggest, ‘we might be invoking with greater pertinence other
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phenomena such as authoritarianism, Caesarism, illiberalism, class struggle, pol-
itical romanticism, racism and so on’ (Molyneux & Osborne, 2017, p. 17). This
is an important point, but their short paper does not develop a full study of the
cost of these occlusions, nor highlight earlier efforts from critical race theorists
to insist upon a closer study of liberalism’s Janus face.
The sociologist Paul Gilroy points out similar methodological occlusions in
Foucault’s work: the tendency to track the history of particular knowledges in
a way that inadvertently devalues and thus obstructs attention to the construc-
tion of ‘truths’ he leaves unperturbed. One example is Foucault’s comparative
inattention to the racist logic of colonial conquest. In Gilroy’s words: ‘The
extensive debate as to whether Negroes should be accorded membership of
the family of mankind… was more central to the formulation and the reproduc-
tion of the modern episteme than Foucault appreciated. I raise this, not to
pillory him… but because his study of that fateful change is an important
resource in our own situation where similar processes are observable’ (1998,
p. 847).2
From the purview of the slave trade and imperial subjugation of nations
deemed by J.S. Mill and his fellow colonial thinkers as too ‘semi-barbarous’
for self-governance (Mill, 2015, p. 405), suspensions of law and juridical
order are not modernity’s state of exception but its rule. A genealogy of liberal-
ism that begins from colonialism spotlights the forms of apartheid that structure
the ‘free market’: catastrophe bonds, vulture funds, microfinancing and other
systems that transform debt, destruction and crisis into forms of investment
are particularly vital arenas for a necropolitical analysis. Rejoining liberalism
to empire resets racism as the orienting ideology of modern governmental
reason (Bhambra, 2016, 2017; Kish & Leroy, 2015; Mehta, 1999; Seamster &
Charron-Chénier, 2017). In short, administrative strategies, bureaucratic
calculations and judicial institutions – what Judith Butler terms the ‘epistemo-
logical ruse of power’ – cannot be disentangled from the efforts to denigrate the
lives of one population in order to secure the dominance of another (Butler,
1992, p. 67).
One of the central lessons of histories of European colonialism was that the
enterprise was beset by farce and futility, ignorance and inaction (e.g. Fabian,
2000; Hunt, 1990; Vaughan, 1991). However, rather than reading the limitations
of colonial rule in terms of an administrative failure, one must situate the art of
government within a logic that encompasses its political and emotional failures
and excesses (Lachenal, 2017; Stoler, 2010). Driven by ‘anxieties of annihil-
ation’ and ‘fantasies of extermination’, colonial logic, Mbembe argues, was ‘sim-
ultaneously religious, mystical, messianic and utopian’ (Mbembe, 2011, p. 116).
The will and sentiments of rule, the collective desires and destructive exuber-
ance, are the pillars of modernity, the categories that, Mbembe suggests,
form the basis of a genealogy of truth.
This special issue takes up Mbembe’s call to develop categories for a critique
of reason that are ‘more tactile’ in two ways. First, it seeks to analyse the epis-
temological assumptions underpinning the growing emphasis on evidence-based
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discourses in contemporary policymaking, training our attention on the norma-
tive, affective and aesthetic dimensions of evidence’s epistemic authority. The
legitimacy of the facts discussed across the special issue hinges upon the vividness
with which they conjure suffering and evoke salvation. Giving that rhetorical force
empirical traction, this collection helps to excavate the ‘structures of feeling’ that
subtend contemporary evidentiary claims and provide new conceptual tools for
sociological critique (Williams, 1977).
Second, in pursuing how the production of sentiment in the context of these
evidence-based initiatives structures the ‘distribution of the sensible’ (Rancière,
2004), the six papers offer new ways of conceptualizing the political economy of
truth. Bringing together anthropologists, sociologists and geographers, the
special issue explores why certain forms of evidence are valued over others;
which populations and voices are strengthened or silenced in the making of
new forms of evidence; and how political paradigms embrace or disavow the
value of evidence in shaping new understandings of causal relationships,
social obligations and political positions. We thus hope to take this ‘negative
moment’ as an occasion to confront the feeling of facts – to elaborate the episte-
mic and aesthetic grammars that cut across the bureaucrat and the expert, the
troll and the global activist.
The moral authority of evidence
The faith of the current era in the power of measurement and quantification as
an instrument of government is, of course, hardly new. From Tocqueville’s
writing on the effort to build a ‘new science of politics’ (1835, p. 12) in nine-
teenth-century America, to utilitarian efforts to promote the common good
through the development of algorithms for calculating the costs of public and
private risks, the modern era has often been defined by what the political the-
orist Letwin (1965) described as the ‘pursuit of certainty’: the effort to restrict
ideological influences on government decisions by basing policies on evidence.
And yet, as Porter (1996) suggests, a society’s penchant for placing trust in
numbers and other tools of standardization is rarely itself an inevitable or ‘stan-
dard’ phenomenon: cultures often differ dramatically in the types of evidence
they commission or censor, revere or denounce.
The empirical imprimatur of modern democracy is the liberal orientation of
knowledge: the degree to which knowledge can be freed from authoritarian jud-
gement. Indeed, when Ronald Aylmer Fisher developed the method of random-
ized design that would form the basis of the RCT, he saw its revolutionary
potential in generating results that ‘any thinking man could understand’
(Fisher, 1935, p. 65). However, drawing conclusions from randomized exper-
iments was never as straightforward as bearing witness to their outcomes; the
early days of the RCT were marked by strident debates on the terms through
which statistical significance ought to be adjudicated (Kelly, 2011). Contempor-
aries of Fisher like Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson, for instance, advanced a
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decision-oriented statistical framework that foregrounded the subjective nature of
judgement by emphasizing that the degree of confidence required by an exper-
imenter depended on the ends to which an outcome was put. Neyman and
Pearson regarded inference not as a matter of knowing the truth, but rather
‘an act of will… to take a particular action, perhaps to assume a particular atti-
tude towards the various sets of hypotheses’ (Gigerenzer et al., 1989, p. 99).
Fisher, for his part, claimed that their model entailed consequences ‘horrifying
for intellectual freedom in the west’ (Fisher, 1955, p. 70).
A rhetorical intensity at odds with the apparent neutrality of statistical
techniques, these debates underscore just what is at stake in the rapproche-
ment of authoritative knowledge and decision-making in real-world exper-
iments. RCTs promise to provide a clear answer to the question of ‘what
works’, ‘unsullied’, as Donovan (2018) puts it, ‘by ideology, politics and
fads’ (2018, p. 15). Their apparent evidentiary robustness serves as a
moral anchor, weighting even the most uncertain of evidence claims with
an aura of equitable evaluation and distributive justice. And yet, despite
the appeal of evidence freed from subjective bias and contextual contingen-
cies, the epistemic blind-spots of an RCT hegemony has been the subject of
considerable controversy. Medical practitioners such as Iain Chalmers and
Ben Goldacre condemn commercial secrecy laws that permit companies to
bury negative trial results, thus endangering lives (see Chalmers, 1990;
Jørgensen et al., 2006; Kendall et al., 2009), while others express concern
about the appropriateness of trialled interventions when the problems that
are being addressed reflect broader socio-economic structural inequalities
that singular interventions are unlikely to remove – to name just a few of
the limits of RCT methodologies which Donovan’s paper in this special
issue further unpacks (cf. Deaton, 2009; Donovan, 2018; Kelly & Geissler,
2012; Petryna, 2007; Timmermans & Berg, 2003; Wahlberg & McGoey,
2007; Will & Moreira, 2016).
From gold standard to old standard
We suggest that the evidentiary authority of RCTs to enable governing auth-
orities to make fair and prudent decisions about research allocation is both
the triumph and the failure of this methodology. In the triumphalist corner,
there are the ‘randomistas’, a powerful epistemic community who share norma-
tive faith in the value of randomized ‘field experiments’ to provide causal evi-
dence of a policy’s effectiveness. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
economists Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo have been at the forefront of
these efforts. In their bestselling book, Poor economics, they cite George
Orwell to bolster a more empathetic approach to the study of poverty and econ-
omic inequality: it is only ‘natural’ for the poor to spend money on seeming
‘indulgences’, because it allows them to rationally survive hardship without
losing their sense of dignity (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011, p. 38).
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Their reference to Orwell has an earlier precedent: Adam Smith’s famous
‘linen shirt’ example, thought to be one of the earliest modern illustrations of
the importance of using empirical evidence to reduce both absolute and relative
poverty. Smith’s point is a compelling one. In Wealth of nations, he acknowl-
edges that ‘strictly speaking’ a linen shift is ‘not a necessary of life’, before
adding that in ‘the present times, through the greater part of Europe, a credi-
table day-labourer would be ashamed to appear in public without a linen
shirt, the want of which would be supposed to denote that disgraceful degree
of poverty which, it is presumed, nobody can well fall into without extreme
bad conduct’ (Smith, 1999 [1776], p. 465).
To lack a linen shirt was thus seen as furnishing in the eyes of both the
labourer and his superior clear and irrefutable evidence of the former’s moral
failings. It is a type of ‘tactile fact’ that no working man could afford to
ignore, for without the means to appear respectable no worker could prove
that he was deserving of receiving more work. Banerjee and Duflo seize upon
what we see as the primary meaning conveyed by scholars like Orwell and
Smith: that even if, say, a shirt made of fine cloth does not at first seem as essen-
tial to survival as, say, food, water or shelter, appropriate clothing is critical to
avoid shame and the stigma of being impoverished. Smith’s linen shirt or
Orwell’s ‘cheap luxuries’ are no different than a television or a cell phone
that people in poverty are sometimes maligned for desiring. Wants, Duflo
and Banerjee insist, can be just as important for economic survival as ‘needs’.
This is an important point, and it is widely shared among the new randomis-
tas. But we suggest their approach often neglects the secondary meaning of
Smith’s example. Smith is not simply making an argument about relative
poverty. Rather, he is making an ever more profound assertion about external
judgement and the problem of social bias. The lack of a clean shirt, he points
out, is seen as evidence of moral failure because ‘it is presumed’ that ‘nobody
can well fall into [poverty] without extreme bad conduct’. Note that Smith
does not agree that individual misconduct or immorality alone can lead to per-
sonal penury.3 He is simply conceding that most people think that that is the
case, and thus a good linen shift, its lack being a demonstrable sign of one’s
inferiority, carelessness and lack of thrift, becomes a necessity for the labourer
rather than an indulgence. Smith recognizes that social judgements of morality
can impose hardship and constraints on the poor even when that judgement is
not rooted in a correct grasp of an underlying causal pattern. Deploying a
Smithian lens to global development would therefore mean coming to grips
with both the ambiguity of wants and the ambiguity of outcomes – a bifocal
approach that tracks the particular advantages and limits of the RCT.
The methodological strength of experimental randomized design is the ability
to gauge the outcomes of a specific intervention. RCTs are a type of ‘close epis-
temology’, an approach that prioritizes realism of its representations rather than
the elegance of its models (Kelly, 2009). The value of RCTs in development
largely rests in their deflationary capacity to cast doubt on overly hyped
claims of a new intervention’s role in saving lives or easing people out of
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poverty. It was RCTs of microfinance initiatives, for example, that dealt a fatal
blow to presumption that microfinance initiatives are playing a major or even a
strong role in improving livelihoods globally. Banerjee, Duflo and others have
spent over a decade studying microfinance programmes and began reporting
as early as 2009 onwards that empirical evidence surrounding the efficacy of
microfinance indicated modestly positive but not ‘transformative’ results (Bane-
rjee et al., 2015, p. 1).
While this may seem like a benign rather than damning indictment of micro-
finance initiatives, the revelation that microfinance initiatives have led to only
negligible gains for recipients has fuelled a tsunami of criticism over the
amount of government aid and private philanthropy expended on rolling out
microfinance programmes across the world. Governments and private donors
continue to spend hundreds of millions each year subsidizing both non-profit
and for-profit microfinance providers, offering ‘aid’ that fattens the revenue
of microfinance providers even when the outcomes for loan recipients have
been modest at best and harmful at worst, with many recipients experiencing
crippling indebtedness (see Cull et al., 2016).
Criticism of government subsidies to for-profit microfinance lenders is just
one example of growing discontent, voiced even by insiders within organiz-
ations such as the World Bank, with the use of development aid to subsidize
commercial banking services (Gabor & Brooks, 2017; McGoey, 2015). Their
concerns have not led to policy change at the World Bank or elsewhere, under-
scoring the fact that RCTs alone rarely produce sufficient evidence of a policy
failure to divert government actors or private donors from pursuing economic
policies that might fail to meet a stated objective, but which still serve their
underlying interests or goals. In such instances, even a harmful policy can be
rationally maintained despite the fact that a stated beneficiary loses out, bol-
stered by the efforts of actors who often find creative ways to strategically
ignore inconvenient evidence (High et al., 2012; McGoey, 2007).
This is the great ‘failure’ of RCTs: the way that even their clearest ‘triumphs’,
such as the ability to furnish proof that microfinance gains are negligible, does
not necessarily lead to policy change. RCTs adherents tend to presume that the
revelation of policy ‘failure’ is sufficient to lead to policy reversal, but often this
is not the case, and importantly the RCT method is incapable of providing a
useful theory of inaction, because it is incapable of investigating the motives of
policy actors who have unstated reasons for avoiding uncomfortable facts. In
our final section below, we expand upon this point, juxtaposing our discussion
with a summary of the six papers that make up this special issue.
‘Leverage epistemologies’ and their limits
The evidentiary promise of ‘close epistemology’ lies in its real-world empirical
investigation in situ. But equally if not more compelling in leading to policy or at
least ideational change are methodologies that harness the power of large data
12 Economy and Society
sets. We call these ‘leverage epistemologies’, because they have either compu-
tational, epidemiological or temporal qualities that allow for the exploitation
of data on a potentially infinite scale. The clearest examples are new digital tech-
nologies that promise to unleash a new ‘science of society’ (Marres, 2017) with
the same optimism that Montesquieu, Burke and Tocqueville once extended to
empirical innovations in the late Enlightenment period. A recent type of ‘lever-
age epistemology’ is the historical and longitudinal analysis that Thomas Piketty
applied to his investigation of inequality levels in a select number of developed
countries over a period of more than 100 years, using a range of sources, from
census data to tax records (McGoey, 2017; Piketty, 2014). In Piketty’s case, it is
the size of his data sets that lends moral authority and political impetus to the
evidentiary claims made.
The example of Piketty is worth juxtaposing next to Duflo and Banerjee
because, importantly, both made very similar claims about the value and the
necessity of narrowing wealth disparities, but they adopted almost diametrically
opposed methodologies for ‘demonstrating’ that there is sufficient evidence for
government and private foundations to change their practices. Piketty has been
outspoken about the limits of RCTs for studying large-scale macroeconomic
change. As he suggested in a 2014 interview, ‘We can’t run a controlled exper-
iment across the twentieth century’. He is still adamant, however, that our
‘shared history’ can lead to a robust understanding of the root causes of escalat-
ing inequality. In his words: ‘All we have is our common historical experience,
but I think this is enough to reach a number of fairly strong conclusions’.4
Unfortunately, it is easy for his detractors to deride this evidentiary promise
as Pollyannaish. Even among people who do broadly support and share his
anxiety about growing wealth disparity there is endless disputation about how
to mitigate the problem. As McGoey and Thiel point out in their contribution
to this special issue, one of Piketty’s critics is Bill Gates, who has stated that
although he agrees with Piketty that wealth inequality is a problem, he disagrees
on how to fix the problem. In particular, Gates insists that both ‘philanthropy’
and ‘investing in companies’ can and should offset a wealthy individual’s obli-
gation to pay more tax. Gates’s belief that offering non-repayable grants to large
corporations such as Mastercard can help to narrow economic inequalities is,
however, unsubstantiated by evidence of any kind. Notably, it clashes with
Piketty’s primary insight: that spectacular financial returns to private investors
over the past 60 years are outpacing national growth levels at an alarming pace,
hindering the state’s capacity to meet social needs.
At a time of sky-high corporate profitability, excessive CEO pay, the shifting
of resources from R&D investment into marketing and advertising outlays, cor-
porate tax evasion and the avoidance of liability for environmental harms, the
idea that private corporations deserve non-repayable grants from tax-subsidized
philanthropic foundations was until recently regarded as derisory – even by the
staunchest market fundamentalists on the libertarian right. The economist
Milton Friedman, for example, scorned the notion that corporate actors
deserve subsidies to execute a ‘social’ mission. In his words, if corporations
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are to ‘make expenditures to foster “social” objectives, then political machinery
must be set up to make the assessment of taxes and to determine through a pol-
itical process the objectives to be served’ (Friedman, 1970). Friedman was
nervous that expanding the remit of the corporation would entail a necessary
democratization of its operations.
Today, the corporation’s remit has been expanded, but without a concomitant
increase of democratic oversight or accountability. McGoey and Thiel’s paper,
as well as the contribution from Ehrenstein and Neyland, are focused on the
ramifications of this development, contributing to a growing body of literature
challenging the ‘value for money’ assumptions that organizations like the Gates
Foundation draw on to rationalize their corporate enrichment gifting practices.
Véra Ehrenstein and Daniel Neyland’s paper explores the establishment of
GAVI, an organization created in 2000 as a novel partnership between the
World Health Organization, the World Bank, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foun-
dation and UNICEF. GAVI claims to have introduced innovative ways to
finance the purchase of vaccines developed by pharmaceutical companies,
improving vaccination coverage across the world. Their paper is focused on a
pneumococcal vaccine rolled out by GAVI over the last decade through the
use of Advanced Market Commitment (AMC), GAVI’s flagship initiative,
billed as a novel ‘market-based’ mechanism to improve the research, develop-
ment and delivery of interventions to treat neglected afflictions.
The demands of engaging in what Ehrenstein and Neyland call ‘referential
work’, including the onus to demonstrate that scalability is feasible, sometimes
necessitates, in their words, ‘specific (and potentially questionable) evidential
exigencies regarding disease rates, treatment efficacy, human bodies and
germs, which are enmeshed with other considerations like political support
and cost’. Ambiguities over the scale of the burden of the health risk and the
cost of the vaccine pervaded the roll-out of the pneumococcal vaccine. One epi-
demiologist they interviewed stated that the harnessing of an early study
showing considerable disease burden in order to advocate for more donor
resources seemed a ‘bit crude’, given the cautious nature of preliminary
results from the study, but the individual also admitted that advocacy helped
to generate awareness about pneumococcal diseases and the need for
vaccination.
A key pillar of pneumococcal advocacy work has been the reinvigorated
emphasis on the notion, championed strenuously by the Gates Foundation,
that every child’s life has equal value. The insistence that every life is worthy
of an equal chance at survival and flourishment has been an influential principle
at the Foundation, leading Bill Gates personally to react angrily when people,
such as Dambisa Moyo, the right-wing author of Dead aid, criticize the effec-
tiveness of aid programmes. Gates referred to Moya’s suggestions as ‘evil’,
casting her criticism in a theological binary between the good and the malevolent
(McGoey, 2015).
As Ehrenstein and Neyland’s paper illustrates, however, stark declarations of
metaphysical rights or wrongs tend to be a last resort for most global health
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actors, which instead rely on the ability to appropriate the evidentiary tools of an
oppositional entity to raise questions of social welfare and health impact in the
opposing party’s own language. In an example reminiscent of Steven Epstein’s
(1996) study of the ways that HIV activists harnessed medical evidence to
demand antiretroviral therapy, Ehrenstein and Neyland show how staff at
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) adopted the economic language of costs
and benefits to insist that the government subsidies used by GAVI to fund
the vaccine were ‘scandalously expensive’, unjustly subsidizing corporations
that had earned $19 billion from the provision of a vaccine that could have
been developed more cheaply outside the AMCmodel. The opacity of commer-
cial pricing strategies – deemed protected information under confidentiality
laws – poses a significant hurdle to judging the cost-effectiveness of new
public–private partnerships like GAVI (see also Gabor & Brooks, 2017;
Hickel, 2017).
Whether or not Western governments overpaid private pharmaceutical com-
panies to deliver the pneumococcal vaccine is not simply an academic question.
Resource availability adheres to a zero-sum logic: the more that private compa-
nies gain from subsidies, the more slashes in expenditure a state actor may need
to make elsewhere. As scholars such as Macklin (2014) point out, all govern-
ments have a responsibility to take appropriate steps to fulfil the human right
to health, described in Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights as ‘the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’ (Macklin, 2014;
Piccard, 2011). But the US government is notoriously reluctant to support
human rights treaties, and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights is no exception: the United States has signed but not ratified it,
making it one of a half-dozen of UN member states to do so. Growing
poverty and worsening health outcomes in wealthy nations such as the
United States raise questions surrounding the morality of tax deductions for
large philanthropic organizations which use their tax-exempt privileges to
offer non-repayable grants to private pharmaceutical companies seen by
Macklin and others as charging exorbitant prices domestically.
The question of whether increasingly influential philanthrocapitalist organiz-
ations like the Gates Foundation and Bloomberg Philanthropies are sufficiently
accountable to the public is the focus of David Reubi’s paper. Drawing together
insights from scholarship on audit cultures and extensive empirical research on
the global tobacco control campaign spearheaded by the Bloomberg Initiative,
Reubi challenges the idea that private foundations rarely respond to, let alone
act upon external dissent. He shows how the respective investments of the
Gates and Bloomberg Foundations in the production of public health
metrics, project reports, log-sheets and data tracking operate as a form of
accountability in itself, answering the call to bring more transparency to
decision-making at private foundations. Comparing the performative powers
of this epidemiological-meets-managerial quantitative deluge, Reubi raises
under-examined questions about the limits and nature of democratic
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accountability in global health. In some ways, the Gates Foundation’s willing-
ness to admit mistakes is itself a form of evidential ‘referential work’, in Ehren-
stein and Neyland’s terms, signalling its open-mindedness and thus its
legitimacy to influence government spending priorities. By admitting its own
earlier failures, the Foundation garners legitimacy while deflecting larger ques-
tions over what legal obligations non-democratic organizations that ‘affect to
trade for the public good’ owe to the public. By bringing Bloomberg and
Gates into comparative light, Reubi illuminates that the nature of those obli-
gations also hinge upon which public – shareholders, donors, constituents, citi-
zens or an epidemiological body politic – is being taken into account (cf. Krause,
2014; Mahajan, 2018).
Reubi’s paper opens with a quip from Bloomberg – ‘in God we trust; every-
one else bring data’. The ecstatic power of data to garner faith and mobilize
action in the face of uncertainty forms the focus of Ann H. Kelly’s paper.
Her work with the World Health Organization (WHO) during the 2013–2016
Ebola outbreak provides the prompt to interrogate the distinct styles of reason-
ing that usher the transformation of a public health crisis into a global security
concern and configure a humanitarian emergency into a site of pharmaceutical
investment. Kelly directs her attention to the accelerated development, testing
and licensure of Ebola vaccines – an experimental and potentially ‘game-chan-
ging’ intervention that captured the imagination of the global health commu-
nity. Introducing an unproven and, indeed, save for animal studies, barely
tested vaccine into an emergency raised a host of ethical, logistical, financial
and political problems. Moreover, the epidemiological justifications for
testing the vaccine were built upon an absence of data, a fear of what was
missing from national reports of incidence, rather than on deductions from
the information available. Kelly shows how the modes of uncertainty attendant
to the declaration of the Ebola outbreak as a public health emergency of inter-
national concern (PHEIC) created the context in which suspension of thorough-
going empiricism was a necessary and, ultimately, moral duty. ‘The imminence
and inscrutability of risk’, Kelly argues, ‘created the space for political action’
(2018).
The forms of fact-making that emerge under these conditions of public health
exigency and epistemic deficit betray a heady blend of moral logic, economic
interest and prophetic vision. Following the debates over the design of clinical
trials as the vaccines made their way from the lab into the field, Kelly shows how
the balance between humanitarian needs and scientific rigour was struck
through an appeal to history: the WHO’s triumphant smallpox eradication pro-
gramme provided the inspiration for the ‘ring vaccination trial’ that was success-
fully implemented in Guinea. As new standards of research practice are being
formulated for an emerging paradigm of emergency research and development,
Kelly believes that the experience during the Ebola outbreak generates critical
lessons into the forms of legitimacy that drive collective and institutional action
in times of public health crisis.
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Kevin Donovan’s paper provides a rich context to those new norms, explor-
ing the uncertainties over which methods produce the most ‘rigorous’ evidence
of both the causality and the effectiveness of various interventions. He focuses
on RCTs in development, tracing the epistemic affinities and thought collec-
tives central to the growing dominance of ‘randomistas’ in public health.
One of his central points is that advocates of RCTs in development often
switch registers when propagating the value of RCTs to different audiences.
When publishing findings in economics journals, practitioners are careful to
ensure that any causal claims are robustly defended; when communicating
with policymakers, Donovan notes, ‘the indeterminacies of accountability and
cost–benefit analysis are emphasized’; and when addressing lay audiences,
‘uncertainty is to be reduced because it impedes the effectiveness of aid and,
therefore, contributes to human suffering’. Donovan notes that the flexible
ability to range between rhetorical registers, alternately stressing and trivializing
the problem of uncertainty, helps RCT advocates ‘to enrol numerous supporters’.
The capacity for different social actors to gauge and choose which ‘face’ to
assert publicly is, of course, an old observation of the social sciences, but the
role that empirically oriented economists play in adding moral gravitas to
funding decisions remains under-theorized. Like Reubi, Donovan’s paper
makes new and original links between older work by Michael Power and
others on ‘audit culture’ and the problem of policy circularity within develop-
ment arenas. As he suggests: ‘it is a tacking back and forth – between promises
of certainty and accusations of uncertainty; between registers of argumentation;
and between audiences – that has helped reconstitute the spirit of international
aid… this lack of certitude has not called into question certainty writ large but
served to justify further experimentation’.
Véra Ehrenstein’s analysis of UN negotiations on global warming demon-
strates the complexity of those registers of argumentation when the object of
intervention is in doubt. Ehrenstein begins where most social science studies
of the politics of global environmental science end. For the political actors
that form the focus of her study, the evidence for climate change is not in
dispute. Yet, consensus on the importance of reducing global carbon emission
does not in any way suggest a clear way forward. Drawing from ethnographic
work with UN decision-making bodies and, in particular, the efforts to
protect rainforests in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ehrenstein demon-
strates how the art of negotiation becomes an end in and of itself, a means to
performatively address divergent concerns while neutralizing the potential of
public discord. Like Kelly, Ehrenstein points to the critical role an imagined
future plays in creating a sense of shared purpose – predictions and promissory
commitments of financial support for forest protection laws and afforestation
activity can help occlude the challenging pragmatics of implementation, and
the further, thornier question of how to demonstrate their impact. Indeed,
Ehrenstein shows how the evidentiary demands of these policies remain under-
determined, a metrological vagueness that on the face of it speaks of a commit-
ment to inclusion of a diversity of metrics, but also betrays an ‘optimistic
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unrealism’ that might never yield the futures these policies hope to sustain. In
other words, uncertainty over the success and failure of past development
gambits demands resolution, which powerful actors, by virtue of their perceived
expertise, level of financial resources or institutional obligation, are enlisted to
fulfil.
Increasingly, actors like the Gates Foundation and Bloomberg Philanthropies
uphold themselves as ‘partners’ in the provision of public services, despite the
fact that the question of what legitimates and obligates them to serve the public
remains unanswered. Until now, the ‘charismatic authority’ wielded by power-
ful philanthropists has largely been seen as sufficient to legitimate their growing
influence over human affairs. This authority comes in part from the ability of
private philanthropists to selectively publicize global health ‘miracles’ even
while troubling questions over cost-effectiveness and corporate harm to the
public are ignored. Indeed, the tangled vested interests of these actors with
the pharmaceutical, tobacco, food and drink industries tend to inflate the
value of market-based initiatives while obscuring the root causes of collective
distress (see Herrick, 2009, 2017).
Thus, in an iterative fashion, today’s increasingly powerful donor class of
wealth elites is able to harness the power of both the ‘new empiricism’ and
what we have called the ‘new theology’, by moving flexibly between empirical
defences of private influence over public spending, on the one hand, and
semi-religious defences of the same, on the other. This tacking process is
never entirely divorced from secular pressures to defend one’s evidence base
through rational rather than spiritual rationales. Indeed, this has been a funda-
mental goal of the Gates Foundation: to use data to show that aid ‘works’ in
saving lives. But when the Foundation’s critics use a similar methodological
approach focused to show that aid initiatives led to meagre or damning
results, as Moyo’s work has suggested, the Foundation is able to rely on its
earlier, principled approach to giving – the belief that ‘every life has equal
value’ – to dismiss criticism as amoral or sacrilegious. A further way to concep-
tualize this flexibility is to suggest that private foundations have the freedom to
shift easily from the framework of a biopolitics – stressing the capacity of private
gifts to emulate the gift of life, literally ‘saving’ souls through private action – to
a framework of necropolitics, insisting that more children will die if aid or phi-
lanthropy is ever criticized. The larger question of whether private actors
deserve to play a determinant role in choosing who lives and who dies is stran-
gely elided from debate even as key players harness a language of life and a
language of death to defend their influence and power.
Conclusion
As the papers in this special issue make clear, questions over which actors are
best placed to deliver public services lie at the centre of the democratic social
contract. In recent years, this debate has increasingly been framed in a
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narrow way, in a language that favours discussions of efficiency over equity,
costs and benefits over the right to access. But an emphasis on ‘what works’
cannot be disentangled from the question of ‘who counts’. It is true, for instance,
that vaccine coverage has improved over the past 20 years across developing
regions. It is also true that the cost has risen enormously, placing pressure on
developing and wealthy countries to rescind availability or divert resources
from other health initiatives, leading to both saved lives but also to an increase
in unnecessary and preventable childhood deaths (Macklin, 2014).
Questions over ‘who counts’ are, of course, old ones. The eighteenth-century
statesman Edmund Burke was simply one of many late Enlightenment figures to
offer a spirited defence of the right of aristocratic classes in Europe to impart
charity on their own terms, free of the forced obligation to fulfil the ‘right’ to
food or shelter. He drew on both the ‘new empiricism’ and the ‘old theology’
of his day to make his points. In the same vein as increasingly anti-egalitarian
Western authorities such as the US government today, Burke insisted that
having the right personnel devoted to the task of determining optimal resource
allocation is more important than any abstract claim to a ‘right’ to social and
economic security. But this draws us back into Smithian territory, and the
problem of false perceptions of morality and liability for poverty. Burke is
wrong to suggest that the ‘right to food or medicine’ is irrelevant to resource
allocation, because recognition of a citizen’s democratic right to challenge
state decision-making is different from the obligation in non-democratic
states to submit to a ruler’s diktats.
This is a point that is well-traversed in political theory, but the epistemologi-
cal problem with Burke’s statement may be less apparent. Burke was a contem-
porary of Smith’s. It is likely that many, if not most, of Burke’s ‘farmers’ and
‘physicians’ whose expertise he appeals to would have shared the presumption
about the poor that Smith warned us about: the tendency to blame the poor for
their destitution, colouring the ability to adjudicate fairly or ‘truthfully’ over
what the poor deserve, because Burke’s own cultural biases limit the ability to
determine the ‘truth’. Similar false presumptions about where the responsibility
for poverty lies are underpinning contemporary austerity measures both domes-
tically and at a geopolitical level. While ‘populist’ and ‘liberal’ Western leaders
alike may express a commitment to foreign aid or philanthropic bequests,
reparations for recent neocolonial acts, such as the invasion of Iraq, or for
more longstanding processes of colonial subjugation seem to fall outside the
scope of humanitarian responsibility and remain an anathema to mainstream
policy discussion.
Today, particularly in countries that have ratified the Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, citizens have a legal right to challenge the lack of
adequate health provision. In the United States, the ability to point out the
US derogation of responsibilities can help to attach ‘shame and blame to govern-
mental neglect’ (Yamin, 2005). But an emphasis on neglect is less compelling
when it comes to private actors. Any effort to ‘shame’ a private philanthropic
entity for its voluntary health expenditures leads to blank stares or even
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anger, as people query the morality of attacking charity – even when philanthro-
pic disbursements can exacerbate the food shortages, ecological strife and wealth
disparities that fuel the need for philanthropic bequests in the first place. An
increasingly powerful group of global policymakers today often appeals to the
robustness of empirical evidence, such as the lives saved through vaccines, to
justify resource allocations that leave the political economy of vaccines pro-
duction unchallenged. In short, the denunciation of the ‘right to food and medi-
cine’ that Burke disparaged at the onset of the French Revolution is as powerful
in our time as it was in Burke’s.
From the effort to contain the spread of infectious disease to the mushroom-
ing of chronic illness across developing and rich countries, the framing of the
world’s most pressing problems hinges on whether a crisis is seen as sufficiently
urgent; on the question of whose death ‘counts’ the most. Collectively, the
papers in this special issue raise new questions about the relationship between
evidence and resource allocation; between empiricism and ‘enlightened’
decision-making. By returning to conflicts that pervaded the late Enlightenment
period, our introduction has emphasized a basic but often forgotten point:
whether a child, man or woman ‘deserves’ to live or die often depends on
whether they are seen as an equal human being. The entitlement to stratify
and to categorize social needs cannot be said to be ‘enlightened’ if a receiving
demographic lacks the power to question the imposition of economic policies
that ‘help’ them in ways that cannot be rejected or overturned. Should the
right to challenge global resource allocation be the purview of the few, or the
right of the many? Whether one sides with Burke or Wollstonecraft is not a
moot point. Throughout the modern period, the acceptance of new truths, of
more truth, has rarely been a peaceful enterprise. Rather, the willingness to
concede that enslaved or conquered peoples ‘should be accorded membership
of the family of mankind’ has been achieved only through the militant righting
of ‘truths’ upheld by good statesmen as godly gospel. In the meantime, the
feudal hoarding of finite resources continues, unmolested by the demands of
populist masses who only in time are lionized as fervently as they were once
condemned.
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Notes
1 We borrow the phrase ‘promiscuous pervasiveness’ from Neil Brenner and col-
leagues, who use it in a different context to describe neoliberalism.
2 Thanks to Michael Halewood for the reference to Gilroy.
3 Most scholarship tends to exclusively focus on the primary meaning conveyed by
Smith, but some scholarship has attended to the second meaning. See in particular
Davis and Sanchez-Martinez (2014). See also recent studies which explore Smith’s
complex, counter-intuitive and neglected writing on the problem and root causes of
wealth inequality (Boucoyannis, 2013; Rasmussen, 2016).
4 http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/five-minutes-with-thomas-piketty-we-
dont-need-19th-century-style-inequality-to-generate-growth-in-the-21st-century/.
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